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Abstract: International agreements about transnational issues are difficult to
reach, as the examples of the Copenhagen summit or the never-ending discussions of
the future of the European Union make clear. In this paper we relate this difficulty
to the political process and the conflicts of interest attached to an agreement, both
within and between national electorates, related to national income distributions.
We set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an
international agreement on the financing of an international public good has to
be negotiated by two elected national delegates. We prove that any international
agreement involves higher taxes in both countries than in the case of no-agreement.
If reachable, an IA may generate losers in either country. If the political process
involves a constraint on tax rates, an agreement may or may not be reached. Finally,
when an agreement is reached, it may exhibit strategic delegation when the median
voters are the Condorcet winners in both countries: this delegation is the outcome
of the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country’s
taxpayers. In brief, the fate of an international agreements depends on national
politics and distributive issues in the involved countries.
Keywords: international agreements, bargaining, delegation, voting.
JEL classification: D72, H77.
Re´sume´ : Les accords internationaux sont difficiles a` atteindre. Dans cet ar-
ticle, nous expliquons cette difficulte´ par les processus politiques nationaux et les
conflits d’inte´reˆt au sein de chaque nation. Nous construisons un mode´le d’e´conomie
politique repre´sentant une e´conomie a` deux pays ou` un accord sur le financement
d’un bien collectif transnational doit eˆtre ne´gocie´ entre les repre´sentants des deux
pays. Nous montrons que tout accord international implique des impoˆts plus e´leve´s
dans les deux pays que dans le cas d’une absence d’accord. Si un accord existe,
il peut se trouver des perdants a` l’accord dans chacun des pays. Si le processus
de ne´gociation suppose une contrainte sur les taux d’imposition, un accord peut ne
pas eˆtre obtenu. Finalement, quand un accord est obtenu, il peut impliquer une
de´le´gation strate´gique quand les e´lecteurs me´dians dans les deux pays sont les vain-
queurs de Condorcet : cette de´le´gation est la re´sultante du conflit entre les e´lectorats
pour transfe´rer le fardeau fiscal sur les contribuables de l’autre pays. Ainsi, le destin
d’un accord international de´pend des jeux politiques nationaux et des questions de
redistribution dans les pays qu’il concerne.
Mots-cle´s: accords internationaux, ne´gociations, de´le´gation, vote.
JEL classification: D72, H77.
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1 Introduction.
The issue of whether countries should agree on international agreements, how to
bargain for them and implement such agreements is a daily concern for governments
and central to international affairs.
It is hard to overemphasize the importance of these agreements. Primary exam-
ples are international agreements on standards (health, telecommunications, patents),
monetary unions, defense alliances, tax agreements, or international environmental
agreements, to name a few. They are easily justified by means of the presence of
cross-border externalities: Given the worldwide determinants of weather forecast-
ing, an international agreement on the sharing of meteorological data seems quite
adequate and in the interest of all.
But international negotiations sometimes fail or lead to agreements much less
ambitious than originally envisioned. The modest outcome of the Copenhagen sum-
mit is a clear example of the difficulty to reach an international agreement on the
global warming issue. The painful process of European union’s institutional upgrad-
ing also exemplifies the difficulty of setting international agreements. Finally, the
creation of the EMU proved to be a mixed political success as not all members of the
European Union decided to join this monetary union. Of course, most international
agreements do not reach such a fame. The United Nations Treaty series, by far the
most comprehensive database on these agreements, contains over 34,000 agreements
made by sovereign nations belonging to the U.N. since 1946. In 1999, 32,939 were
bilateral.1 This series registers the “Agreement concerning financial cooperation on
the Lake Volta Transport System”, signed in 1980 between the Federal Republik
of Germany and Ghana, as well as the 1967 “Outer Space multilateral agreement”,
forbiding the placement of weapons of mass destruction into orbit, onto celestial
bodies or in outer space.
The outcome of a negotiation process towards the establishment of an interna-
tional agreement (hereafter IA) depends on a few crucial features: the type of ties
imposed on the agreement, the nature of the process through which the various
countries negotiate an agreement, and last but not least, the calculus made by na-
tional electorates, when voters are diversely affected by the agreement and thus hold
different views about its desirability. In particular, these structural features explain
why some agreements are not reached and the international negotiation process may
lead to a failure, that is the inability to establish some sort of cooperative effort.2
This amounts to say that distributive considerations cannot be neglected in the
setting of an IA as any agreement involves taxes and public spending. Because
a proposed agreement, or an expected one, leads to a different balance between
1According to the U.N. charter, “every treaty and every international agreement entered into
by any Member of the United Nations after the present charter comes into force shall as soon as
possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it”. The list of agreements can be
found at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/.
2Langlois and Langlois (2006) have modified the Rubinstein approach to bargaining and con-
clude that various international agreements, such as SALT and NAFTA, are consistent with their
findings. However they only focus on the bargaining procedure without endogenizing the choice of
the bargainers.
3
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.52
losses and gains when agents are characterized by different levels of resources, it is
diversely appreciated by the voters: some may be harmed and consequently vote
against it, whereas some are net beneficiaries and support it.3 Thus distributive
effects, associated to an international agreement, play a role through the political
process.
However the existing theoretical literature on international agreements has largely
neglected the political aspect of the negotiation process, linked to electoral consid-
erations.4
In this paper we tackle the issue of the negotiation of international agreements
in a political economy perspective, focusing on international agreements dealing
with the provision of public goods. We deal solely with technological externalities,
not pecuniary externalities. We do not address agreements on price restrictions
or competitive issues, like international trade agreements or agreements on tariffs.
This implies that trade liberalization rounds under the guidance of the WTO are
out from the scope of the paper.
We set up a simple economic model with an international public good, financed
by contributions from both countries. This good is funded through taxes, levied at
the national level.5 There is an unequal income distribution in each country. These
distributions may differ across countries. There is no international authority and
therefore the two national governments are the relevant authorities to tackle the
common issue.
We then specify a political process in which an IA is negotiated between delegates
from the two countries, elected through a democratic process taking place in each
country. We study two types of IA, involving different sets of constraints on the
policies to be implemented: one imposes an equal tax rate provision in each country
(“equal tax rate rule”), the other one imposes an equal gains provision (“equal gains
rule”).
The political process is formally a two-stage game. In the first stage, electorates
in each country vote to elect their representative or “delegate” at the negotiation
3The way voters express their opinion depends of course on the electoral system in place.
4In general, IAs dealing with public goods have been studied by means of coalition theory and
bargaining theory. This is particularly true for the case of environmental international agreements
(Barrett, 2003). Currarini and Tulkens (2004) address the issue of environmental international
agreements and hint at a political economy perspective, but they mainly develop a coalition forma-
tion approach. Buchholtz et al. (2005) show in the case of environmental international agreements
how voters vote strategically in both countries, but assuming side-payments in the bargaining pro-
cess, they assume away the divergent goals of delegates. As a result Alesina et al. (2005) study
the impact of voting procedures within an international union where the various members have to
reach a common decision by vote and do not address the bargaining of an IA. Rota-Graziosi (2009)
is the closest to our setting. Contrarily to what is assumed here, he focuses on the ratification
in each country of an IA, once it has been bargained. Moreover he does not address the impact
of the inequality schedule on a tax distortive mechanism, which is the main focus of our analy-
sis. International trade agreements have been extensively studied, including by political economy
theoreticians. But we do not deal here with this kind of IAs.
5It would be formally equivalent to consider two national public goods which generate cross-
border externalities.
4
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.52
table. In the second stage, the two delegates meet, negotiate and may strike an agree-
ment. If no agreement is reached, then the two delegates apply the non-cooperative
policies of their choice.
With such an apparatus, we are able to prove that an IA involves higher taxes in
both countries than non-cooperation. We also prove that there may exist losers to
an IA in each country. The political process may fail to establish an IA, depending
on the institutional constraint imposed on the negotiation process: this may happen
in the case of an equal tax rate rule.
Assuming a simple majority rule, in the case of a successful negotiation process,
leading to the establishment of an IA, there may be strategic delegation in the fol-
lowing sense: we determine sufficient conditions under which the Condorcet winner
in at least one country is the median voter and chooses not to go to the negotiation
table but send someone else as the country’s delegate.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the second section, we present our model
of a two-country economy with an international public good, generating interjuris-
dictional externalities. Then, in Section 3, we define the political process through
which international agreements are negotiated between the two countries. In section
4, we focus on the possibility of international agreements and characterize the sets
of feasible agreements in relation with the assumed political process. In the two
following sections, we specifically explore the negotiation process, taking into con-
sideration two types of institutional constraints to be satisfied by the international
agreement. Section 7 concludes.
2 A two-country economy with international pub-
lic good.
We consider a two-country world economy. In each country, there is a continuum of
agents, diffenciated by income. We denote by yi the income of agent i. In Country
j, fj(y) represents the population density of agents with income y. We denote by
yminj and y
max
j respectively the minimal and maximal incomes in Country j. We set
Cj = {y; fj(y) > 0} = [y
min
j ;y
max
j ]
We get:
Nj =
∫ ymaxj
yminj
fj(y)dy
where Nj denotes the population in Country j.
In order to focus solely on the impact of the endowment distributions, we as-
sume that total endowments are equal in both countries and normalized to 1, i.e.∫ ymaxj
yminj
yfj(y)dy = 1, for j = 1, 2. The median individual’s income in country j is
denoted by ymj .
The individual utility of an agent i with income yi depends both on her con-
sumption of a private good, ci, and on the provision of an international public good,
shared by the two countries and financed through their contributions.
5
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Wi = W (ci, G) = ci +G (1)
where G denotes the utility derived from a “global” public good, assuming a linear
separable utility in consumption and G.
Agents are taxed so as to finance this public good and taxation is proportional
to income. Since incomes are exogenously given, as the provision of the public good
depends on the tax rates applied in each country, G depends on both tax rates:
G = G(τ 1, τ 2) (2)
where τ j denotes the tax rate applied in country j. G(.) is an additive and separable
function, increasing in its two arguments.6 Both countries have a symmetric effect
on the public good and therefore:
G = H(τ 1) +H(τ 2). (3)
H(τ) is assumed to be an increasing concave function of τ . We assume in the
following that the concave increasing function H(τ) is defined as such:
H(τ) =
τ 1−θ
1− θ
, θ ∈]0; +∞[, θ 6= 1, H(τ) = ln τ for θ = 1. (4)
The concavity ofH(τ) depends positively on θ. If θ is bigger or equal to 1, the absence
of public good provision (G = 0) leads to a catastrophic situation as Wi = −∞, for
every i. On the other hand, if θ > 1, such an absence is not catastrophic as Wi > 0,
for every i, even when G = 0.7
Since taxation is proportional to income, we get for agent i living in Country j:
ci = (1− τ j)yi (5)
Given the previous equations, her welfare can be rewritten as:
W (yi, τ j , τ−j) = yi(1− τ j) +H(τ j) +H(τ−j) (6)
= F (yi, τ j) +H(τ−j) (7)
where we set
F (y, τ) = y(1− τ ) +H(τ).
The present model is minimal but sufficient to emphasize the key ingredients
of a political approach to IAs: each individual faces a trade-off between private
consumption and the benefit from the international public good; in each country
there is inequality so voters do have different views on this trade-off. As the global
public good is shared by both countries, this provides an argument in favor of some
form of cooperation, through an IA.
Each agent in any country wants to tax and spend for the public good because
her individual welfare is directly affected by its provision: the higher this provision
the higher the G component of welfare.8
6Recall that in each country total endowment is equal to 1.
7A more general specification would be H(τ ) = b. τ
1−θ
1−θ
. We assume b = 1 for simplicity reasons.
8In the sequel, we refer to an agent by means of her income, and we write “agent yi”.
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3 The Politics of International agreements (IA).
The logic of an IA between two sovereign countries is to cooperate so as to improve
the situation of each country, as seen by its policymaker, compared to the situation
of no-cooperation. There must be unanimity upon an IA between the two national
policymakers: If one policymaker, exerting national sovereignty, opposes a proposed
international scheme for the funding of the public good, it cannot be enforced in her
country. In our setting, a country’s policymaker is its delegate.
To formalize this logic, we set up a game with the following sequential develop-
ment:
1. The election stage. First, each national constituency decides on who will par-
ticipate on the negotiation of the IA on its behalf. This decision may be taken
by means of different political mechanisms. In the following, when we specif-
ically study the political process used to choose a delegate, we shall assume
that this choice is done by means of a simple majority vote. A country delegate
is restricted to belong to the population of this country.
2. The negotiation stage. The two national delegates are characterized by their
incomes y˜1 and y˜2. When the negotiators meet, they negotiate over the tax
rates to apply in each country. Moreover the IA is constrained to follow a given
rule which is exogenously given and is defined below. If there is no agreement,
the non-cooperative tax rates preferred by the two delegates are implemented.
There is no uncertainty. As voters are assumed to be rational agents, they
perfectly calculate the final outcome of their decisions.
Given the structural characteristics of the two constituencies and obviously the
differing benefits obtained from the public good, whether an IA can be attained
depends on the political process through which such an IA is investigated. In par-
ticular, it is common to observe that negotiators are given some constraints on how
to negotiate, which limit their latitude at the negotiation table. These may be con-
straining rules on the instruments and/or the objectives of the negotiation process
under which negotiators look for an agreement. As we want to investigate the im-
pact of differents constraints on the obtention and the characteristics of an IA, we
consider 2 types of constraining rules.
R1 Equal tax rate rule: an agreement must simultaneously be feasible, that is
acceptable by both country delegates, and satisfy the constraint that a common
tax rate (τ 1 = τ 2 = τ ) be applied by each country.
R2 Equal gains rule: an agreement must be feasible and satisfy the constraint that
both delegates draw equal gains from the IA.
The first one, R1, is an example of a constraint put on the use of instruments,
whereas the second one, R2, is an example of a constraint put on the benefits.
7
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Given our political economy perspective, rules can be justified through politically
feasibility considerations.9 A rule is a restriction on an agreement or an outcome
which renders this agreement or outcome politically acceptable. In this view, as far
as instruments are concerned, voters in each country may impose at some constitu-
tional level that the two countries share the same effort with respect to the common
good. This corresponds to an equality in the instruments fixed by the negotiators,
that is rule R1. Alternatively, it may seem “fair” to the voters in one country that
their country obtains a benefit from the agreement, proportionate to the benefit
obtained by the other country. The second rule R2 is a simple example, adapted to
our framework, of such a constraint.
Other rules could of course be studied. We restrict to these two rules as they are
examples of rules imposed either on the use of policy instruments or on the national
benefits linked to the agreement.10
We need to specify how the delegates bargain at the negotiation table. We
shall assume that delegates bargain according to the Nash-bargaining solution.11
Finally, any negotiation process between delegates requires the definition of the
non-cooperative equilibrium attached to these delegates. Formally, no-cooperation
is defined as follows. Each delegate sets the tax rate to be applied to his country
non-cooperatively, taking as given the other country’s policy decision. That is, the
optimal tax rate that agent i, characterized by income yi, living in country j, would
like to prevail is defined as:
τ ∗(yi) = argmax
τ j
W (yi, τ j , τ−j) = argmax
τ j
F (yi, τ j)
Her response depends on her endowment, as the tax rate generates the funding used
for the provision of the public good. We find easily that τ ∗(yi) = (yi)
−1/θ: the lower
the value of yi, the more agent i accepts a high tax rate so as to get a higher provision
of the public good. The parameter θ determines the relative benefits associated with
the public good for any agent. The higher θ, the larger the tax rate, and therefore
the part of national income devoted to the public good, wished by any individual.
The non-cooperative equilibrium, (τ ∗1, τ
∗
2), does not depend on the type of rule
being followed in the negotiation process. In the following proposition, we charac-
terize such an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique non-cooperative equilibrium (τ ∗1, τ
∗
2) where τ
∗
j
refers to the tax rate wished by the delegate y˜j in Country j and is equal to:
τ ∗j = argmax
τ j
F (y˜j, τ j) and y˜j = H
′(τ ∗j ) = (τ
∗
j )
−θ (8)
τ ∗j is a decreasing function of y˜j.
9There are many ways to legitimate the imposition of rules in a setting with multiple players.
They are often justified by some incentive considerations or for time-inconsistency reasons. Here,
as we do not consider any asymmetric information problem and our sequential game is neatly
defined, these considerations do not apply.
10Given the assumed equality in power and the absence of size effects, we concentrate on equal
rules. Our results generalize to other linear rules at the expense of clarity.
11See Muthoo, 1999, for a detailed presentation of the Nash-bargaining process.
8
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Proof See Appendix A. 
Notice that τ ∗j = τ
∗(y˜j) is independent from τ
∗
−j
. This dominant strategy
characteristics is due to the assumption of additivity of G. The marginal impact of
τ j on j’s welfare does not depend on τ−j .
12 Finally, given the positivity of θ, the
tax rate desired by an agent is a decreasing function of her income. The poor are in
favor of the public good as they are less sensitive to the proportional tax levied on
them than the rich. This solution will be used as a benchmark for the assessment
of IAs. Indeed, the status quo in the Nash-bargaining between two given delegates
is assumed to be the non-cooperative equilibrium for these two delegates.
For an agent i, in country j, the gain derived from an IA, setting a pair of tax
rates (τ 1, τ 2), with respect to non-cooperation is:
Γj(yi, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = W (yi, τ j, τ−j)−W (yi, τ
∗
j , τ
∗
−j)
= [H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2)]− yi(τ j − τ
∗
j). (9)
The gain drawn by a given agent in a given country from an IA negotiated
between two delegates is computed relative to the situation which would prevail, had
this precise agreement not been obtained, that is the non-cooperative equilibrium
obtained if the two delegates do not succeed in setting an agreement. Hence this
gain depends first on her income yi, that is the tax base upon which national taxes
are levied, second on the tax pair related to the agreement, (τ j, τ−j), and the tax
pair related to the no-agreement situation, (τ ∗j , τ
∗
−j). This comes directly from the
assumption that the delegates have control both on the reaching of an agreement,
and on the non-cooperation equilibrium. This gain is the sum of two components.
The first one, [H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2)] , is identical for any agent living
in any of the two countries: this comes from the assumption that the public good
is common to both countries and does not generate differentiated benefits. The
second one, −yi(τ j − τ
∗
j), is specific to an agent, depending on his income, and the
tax rates enforced in his country. Agents dislike an increase in taxation linked to an
international agreement (as it represents a reduction in private consumption) and
the more so the richer they are.
Given these notations, the “equal gains rule” corresponds to an IA specifying a
pair of tax rates (τ 1, τ 2) such that Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2).
As we shall see, the set of constraints which defines the type of agreement and is
imposed upon the negotiators, may or may not hamper their capacity to reach an
agreement, and therefore affects the individual gains drawn from an agreement.
12This assumption could be relaxed at the expense of simplicity. As we are interested in the
impact of an IA relative to the case of non-cooperation, more than about the properties of non-
cooperative policies with respect to the public good, this assumption suffices.
9
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4 Feasible agreements.
We first want to check that there is scope for negotiating over the public good.
That is, we want to see whether, given a pair of delegates (y˜1, y˜1), there are pairs of
tax rates such that if chosen, they generate positive gains for each of the delegates.
Formally we first give two definitions:
Definition 1 The set of feasible agreements is
T (y˜1, y˜2) = {(τ 1, τ 2); Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) ≥ 0 and Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) ≥ 0} .
Definition 2 The set of strongly feasible agreements is
T+(y˜1, y˜2) = {(τ 1, τ 2); Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) > 0 and Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) > 0} .
The set of feasible agreements depends on the pair of delegates involved in the
negotiating process. This comes from the critical role played by delegates: first,
they bargain for themselves, having in mind their own gains without any altruistic
motive; second, in case of no-agreement, they are the ones who select, for their
own country, the non-cooperation tax rates. The set of strongly feasible agreements
includes pairs of rates generating a strictly positive gain for each delegate.
The equilibrium of a game leading to an IA must belong to the set of feasible
agreements corresponding to the pair of delegates characterizing this equilibrium.
This amounts to say that the set of feasible agreements is contingent on the pair of
individuals who bargain over the agreement and varies with this pair. In other words,
at the election stage, voters in each country need to have in mind that they don’t
choose a delegate bargaining with her counterpart over a fixed set of possibilities,
but that this set of possible outcomes itself is part of the equilibrium of the game
and varies with the pair of delegates. This proves how complex are the strategies of
the voters when dealing with IAs.
Given these definitions, we first prove the following:
Proposition 2 For any given (y˜1, y˜2), T (y˜1, y˜2) is a convex subset of [τ
∗
1; 1]× [τ
∗
2; 1]
with (τ ∗1, τ
∗
2) ∈ T (y˜1, y˜2). Moreover, T+(y˜1, y˜2) is non-empty.
Proof See Appendix B. 
The set of feasible agreements is delimited by two curves, as shown in Figure 1.
The curve {Γ1 = 0} corresponds to the set of tax rates such that the delegate of
Country 1 makes no gain with respect to the non-cooperative equilibrium (τ ∗1, τ
∗
2);
the curve {Γ2 = 0} is similarly defined for the delegate of Country 2. These two
curves necessarily intersect at (τ ∗1, τ
∗
2). One curve is concave, the other convex be-
cause of the assumptions made on the utility function. The set of feasible agreements
is convex.
An important characteristics of T (y˜1, y˜2) is that it implies more taxation in both
countries compared to what we get under no-cooperation. This can be explained
10
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Figure 1: Set of reachable agreements T (y˜1, y˜2)
as follows. There are positive externalities between the two countries which explain
why the non-cooperation solution is suboptimal from the perspective of the two
delegates. An IA implies positive gains in both countries. Country j gains from an
agreement if for a given tax rate τ j, the other country increases its taxing effort,
that is its funding of the common public good. Given that this must be true for
both countries, an IA implies more taxation in both countries.
If we impose constraints on an IA, such as the rules R1 and R2, these restrictions
will imply another set of feasible agreements, actually to be a subset of the set we
have just defined. We shall develop on this point in the sequel.
The notion of a (strongly) feasible agreement suffices us to show that the benefits
drawn from a feasible IA by individuals are differentiated according to their personal
positions, that is their incomes. In particular, it may happen that a feasible IA
generates losers as well as beneficiaries as we can prove the following:
Proposition 3 For any given strongly feasible agreement (τ 1, τ 2), linked to a couple
of delegates (y˜1; y˜2), there exist ŷ1 ∈]y˜1,+∞[ and ŷ2 ∈]y˜2,+∞[, such that
for i ∈ Cj, we have yi > ŷj ⇔ Γj(yi, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) < 0 (10)
The threshold value ŷj is a decreasing function of y˜j, and an increasing function of
y˜−j.
Proof See Appendix C. 
Here we consider a given strongly feasible agreement (τ 1, τ 2). Using (9), it is
immediate to remark that, as the term associated with the global public good is
independent from individual income, and the second term, linked to taxation, is
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.52
monotonously decreasing with individual income, the individual gain Γi is decreas-
ing with yi. The richer is an agent, the lower the gain he gets from an agreement
(τ 1, τ 2), as he increasingly resents the increase in taxes involved with the IA. As
the agreement considered is strongly feasible, it generates positive gains for the two
delegates y˜1 and y˜2 and hence, it is also true for any agent who is poorer that his
country’s delegate. On the contrary, for an agent arbitrarily rich, the gain is nega-
tive (it is a loss) and arbitrarily large in absolute value. This explains why there is
a threshold value ŷj > y˜j for which the gain is null.
If the delegate of Country −j gets richer, he taxes less in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Hence the gain drawn from an agreement stating a given pair of tax
rates by any agent in Country j increases. Therefore the threshold income in j is
an increasing function of the income of the delegate chosen in −j.
On the other hand, for a given pair of tax rates (τ 1, τ 2) obtained through an IA,
a richer delegate in Country j would choose a lower non-cooperative tax rate. This
would have two effects on Country j’s residents. First, such a decrease has a taxing
impact: less taxation ceteris paribus increases private consumption for all residents
in Country j, which reduces the gain drawn from the pair (τ 1, τ 2). Second, it has a
public good provision effect: it reduces the amount of public good non-cooperatively
provided in Country j, which harms the residents in this country, and therefore
augments the gain drawn from (τ 1, τ 2). The specification of the utility function
is such that the first effect dominates the second one. Therefore, since the non-
cooperative tax rate is a decreasing function of the delegate’s income, the threshold
value in j is a decreasing function of the income value of the delegate chosen in j.
This proposition makes explicit the distributive effects of an IA across nations
formed of differentiated agents. As their personal situations differ (here because of
income distribution), different agents draw different gains from a given IA. When the
two delegates care solely about their own welfare (admittedly an extreme case, but
which could be relaxed without modifying this qualitative result), an IA generating
gains for these delegates and therefore for agents similar to them may well generate
losses to some agents, if they are sufficiently richer than their country’s delegate.
5 The equal tax rate rule.
Let us now turn to the study of particular rules imposed on IAs. In general, ne-
gotiators of an IA do not have total freedom but are subjected to rules that an
IA must fulfill. These rules may come from constitutional and legal considerations,
customs, ethical considerations unanimously shared by the populations of the two
countries, and so on. We shall not investigate their origin. Indeed, we shall solely
study two such rules, in order to show that they generate strikingly different prop-
erties attached to an IA. The first one, to be considered in this section, imposes that
delegates must bargain over an IA which sets a unique and common tax rate upon
both constituencies (R1).
As we said earlier, imposing this rule on IAs implies a narrower set of feasible
agreements. Hence we use the following:
12
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Definition 3 The set of feasible agreements under rule R1 is
T 1(y˜1, y˜2) = T (y˜1, y˜2) ∩∆.
where ∆ = {(τ 1, τ 2) |τ 1 = τ 2} .
Definition 4 The set of strongly feasible agreements under rule R1 is
T 1+(y˜1, y˜2) = T+(y˜1, y˜2) ∩∆.
These definitions immediately derive from the previous ones on sets of feasible
agreements.
5.1 The (non-)existence of IA.
The first issue we encounter is whether international agreements are feasible under
the R1 rule. If the set T 1+(y˜1, y˜2) is empty, there exists no agreement which can be
obtained by these two delegates which could simultaneously improve their situations
compared to the no-cooperative equilibrium. We prove that T 1+(y˜1, y˜2) may be empty
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 T 1(y˜1, y˜2) may be empty. More precisely:
Let b(θ) =
(
θ
(
21/θ − 1
))θ/(1−θ)
> 1 for θ 6= 1 and b(1) = 4
e
.
Defining the cone C(θ) = {(y˜1, y˜2);
y˜2
y˜1
∈ [ 1
b(θ)
; b(θ)]} we have:
- if (y˜1, y˜2) ∈ C(θ), there exists an equal rate agreement;
- if y˜j > b(θ)y˜−j, then the country j delegate rejects any equal rate agreement.
Proof: See Appendix D. 
First, there may not exist a feasible agreement under R1, for a given pair of
delegates. That is, this pair is unable to find a tax rate, to be applied in both
countries, which maximizes the product of their gains. At least, one of them prefers
the non-cooperative solution to any tax rate jointly enforced by both countries.
This can be understood in the following way. Remark that if both delegates are
characterized by the same amount of income, it is easy for them to find a solution.
It is the rate which internalizes the externality generated by the financing of the
common good in one country and impacting on the welfare of the delegate from
the other country. But as soon as the two delegates have different incomes, their
interests start diverging.
The poorer delegate is in favor of a higher tax rate, whereas the richer one is
in favor of a lower one. Hence a common tax is a way for the poor to extract more
income from the rich for the public good. The poorer delegate pushes for more tax,
with respect to the no-agreement case, the richer delegate tends to resist this push,
even though an agreement leads to an increase in the provision of the public good,
because a disproportionate part of its funding is borne upon him. If their incomes
13
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Figure 2: Cone C(θ)
are too far apart, and therefore their interests in the common good largely diverge,
the rich delegate will prefer the no-cooperation equilibrium to any common tax rate
imposed on both countries. The gain from the internalization of the externality
through the public good does not compensate for the loss from having to suffer a
too high tax rate, with respect to the no-cooperation tax rate that the delegate can
impose on his country.
The result that the two incomes must not be too far apart is expressed by the
fact that the pair of delegates’ incomes must belong to a cone C(θ). For a given value
of θ, given the poor delegate’s income, there is a critical value for the rich delegate’s
income such that above it, the rich delegate rejects any agreement as it implies that
he support a disproportionate share of the tax burden. If the poor delegate’s income
is very low, at a given common tax rate, she will contribute very little to the public
good; consequently, the threshold value associated with this low level of income is
itself very low as the richer delegate is sensitive to the contribution of the poorer
delegate compared to his own. Given the symmetry assumption (see Equation (3)),
this explains the symmetrical cone.
The rich delegate may come from either country. That is why the delegate from
either country may reject an agreement. In other words, inequality between the
two delegates plays a critical role not only in the shaping of an IA, but on its very
existence.
5.2 Bargaining.
We shall now suppose that IAs meeting the restriction R1 exist. More precisely,
we assume that the pair of delegates (y˜1, y˜2) ∈ C(θ), and therefore T
1(y˜1, y˜2) is not
empty. Hence there exists a tax rate τ r such that (τ r, τ r) belongs to T 1(y˜1, y˜2) and
14
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is the solution of the bargaining process taking place between the two delegates.
In other words, given a pair of delegates, we focus on the characteristics of the IA
which results from their bargaining. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
delegate from Country 2 is richer than the delegate from Country 1 (y˜1 < y˜2). As
delegates adopt the Nash-bargaining solution, the tax rate τ r maximizes the product
of the gains of the two delegates:
τ r = argmaxτ ;(τ ,τ)∈T 1(y˜1,y˜2) γ(τ),
where
γ(τ) = Γ1(y˜1, τ , τ , τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)× Γ2(y˜2, τ , τ , τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2).
We are able to offer the following proposition about the characteristics of the
agreed IA under R1:
Proposition 5 A Nash-bargained equal rate IA is such that, on the set {(y˜1; y˜2); y˜1 <
y˜2}, τ
r is a decreasing function of y˜2 , and τ
r is an ambiguous function of y˜1.
Proof See Appendix E. 
When the incomes of the two delegates get closer, their objectives become more
congruent. In the limit, if both delegates happen to have the same income, their
interest will be identical, and both of them will aim at the same tax rate: there will
be no net transfers between them through the common tax rate. But as we have
just seen, if they are far apart, the richer delegate will obtain lower benefit from the
agreement. If they are too far apart, there is no agreement.
In this perspective, an agreement under the constraint of equal tax rates, depends
on two features:
1. the absolute levels of delegate’s income, as a richer delegate favors a lower
(common) tax rate.
2. the discrepancy between the two delegate’s incomes.
For the richer delegate (y˜2), if he gets richer, two effects work in the same di-
rection: his distaste of taxation increases both because he gets richer and relatively
richer than y˜1. Hence he unequivocally bargains for a lower common tax rate. How-
ever for the poorer delegate (y˜1), these two effects work in opposite direction: if
she gets richer, her distaste of taxation increases, but her interests become more
congruent with the other delegate as there is less imbalance in the financing of the
international public good. If the second effect dominates the first one, this may lead
to an IA specifying a higher common tax rate.
15
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5.3 Delegating.
Now we turn to the election stage of the delegates so as to complete the study of the
equilibrium of the extensive game when R1 is imposed on the negotiation process.
There are two political issues in this game between multiple agents involved in the
bargaining over a common interest. The first issue is about the voting pattern taking
place in each country: What are the respective influences of the various voters? How
the elected delegate in the partner country influences the voting pattern? In partic-
ular, given a political decision rule, there may exist a decisive voter, who is critical
in selecting the delegate: can he be identified? The second issue is the identity of
the delegate. In particular, it may be that the decisive voter (if he exists) prefers
not to go personally to the negotiation table, but send another individual, better
capable of defending the decisive voter’s interest, even if he bargains for himself,
without any altruistic motive. The latter case exhibits “strategic delegation”.
In order to explore the election stage, we restrict our attention to the case where
the election of a delegate in one country is done according a simple majority rule.
Up to now, all our results were compatible with many different political schemes
for choosing national delegates. The issue of the political equilibrium leading to the
choice of delegates is complex because there are many possible outcomes for this
game. Formally, both delegates chosen by the electorates may or may not belong to
the cone C(θ), or one may belong to the cone and not the other. Given the sequential
game we study, it is not easy to find an equilibrium in any situation. Of course,
the adding of additional stages in case of deadlocks would allow us to do just that.
But this is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, in this subsection, we explore
a special case where any agent in Country 2 is richer than any agent in Country
1.13That is, we make the following assumption:
H: ymax1 < y
min
2 .
This assumption allows us to stress the importance of “between-country” in-
equality. We use the ratio
ymin2
ymax1
as a rough measure of this inequality: the higher this
ratio, the higher the difference between individual incomes for any pair of agents
belonging to different countries. Under this assumption, we can prove that the two
cases of strategic delegation and no strategic delegation may happen when delegates
bargain for an equal tax rate international agreement.
First, we offer the following
Proposition 6 Under H, if
ymin2
ymax1
> b(θ), there is no agreement. Under the simple
majority rule, in each country the median voter is the Condorcet winner and there
is no strategic delegation in both countries.
13Given our assumption of equal aggregate endowments, this implies that Country 1 is more
populated than Country 2.
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Proof See Appendix F. 
In this proposition, we first show that strategic delegation may not happen. We
investigate a special case, admittedly restrictive, where no pair of agents delegated
by the two countries is able to reach an international agreement because of a large
between-country inequality: any pair of potential delegates is characterized by a
large difference in individual incomes, and therefore the individual interests of any
pair of delegates are too far apart. Given that each agent in any country has
a preferred policy which is a dominant strategy, the decision taken in the other
country has no influence on the choice of the delegate. Therefore any agent would
prefer to be at the negotiation table: the impossibility of an agreement would then
lead to a no-agreement solution in which his own preferred non-cooperative tax rate
would be imposed. As the preferred tax rate varies unambiguously with individual
income, no agent is able to maximize the welfare of agent i, other than i herself.
Hence if under a given political rule, i happens to be the Condorcet winner, she
chooses to delegate herself to the negotiation table: there is no strategic delegation.
For this precise reason, under a simple majority electoral rule, the median voter
theorem applies and the median voter is the Condorcet winner.
Now we prove that strategic delegation may happen under different circum-
stances. We get the following
Proposition 7 Under H, if 1 <
ymax2
ymin1
< b(θ), there is an agreement. Under the
simple majority rule, in Country 2, the median voter is a Condorcet winner and
there is strategic delegation, as the chosen delegate is richer than the median voter.
Proof See Appendix G. 
There is strategic delegation in the following sense. Given this assumption, it is
immediate that ym2 > y˜1 and y˜2 > y˜1, ∀y˜1 ∈ C1.
Given the second set of inequality, and the equal tax rate rule, the marginal gain
associated with an increase in τ r, for y˜2, is negative and it will be lower the richer
is y˜2. Hence the agreed common tax rate will be decreasing in the income of the
delegate from Country 2 for any delegate chosen in Country 1.
Given the first inequality (ym2 > y˜1), the median voter in Country 2 would
prefer a lower tax rate than the one obtained through bargaining with country 1’s
delegate y˜1. Since the agreed common tax rate is unambiguously decreasing in y˜2,
by choosing a sufficiently rich delegate, the median voter in Country 2 is able to get
closer to her preferred tax rate. Hence she delegates strategically.
Finally, in the case of a common tax rate, the individual preferences in Country
2 are single-peaked. And thus the median voter theorem applies: the median voter
is the Condorcet winner in this country.
The same results cannot be proven for Country 1. This is due to the ambiguity
we highlighted in Proposition 5: it may happen that, given the income distributions
in both countries, facing a given delegate from Country 2, some poorer agents in
Country 1 are in favor of a lower common tax rate than richer agents.
17
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6 The equal gains rule.
As we have just seen, imposing a restriction on the negotiation process, such as
a common tax policy, may lead to the impossibility of reaching any agreement at
the negotiation table. This impossibility result comes from the fact that the two
delegates may be so far apart, and their interests so different that they cannot agree
on a common tax rate. Imposing that the two delegates must make an equal gain is
a way to attempt to reconcile the two delegates with the bargaining process. What
are the properties and consequences of such a rule?
In order to answer these questions, we shall follow the same logic as in the case
of the common tax rate rule. First we give the following
Definition 5 The set of feasible agreements under rule R2 is
T 2(y˜1, y˜2) = T (y˜1, y˜2) ∩D.
where D = {(τ 1, τ 2) |Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)}.
Definition 6 The set of strongly feasible agreements under rule R2 is
T 2+(y˜1, y˜2) = T+(y˜1, y˜2) ∩D.
These definitions are similar to definitions 3 and 4.
6.1 Existence of IA.
First we investigate the possibility for two delegates to find a pair of tax rates
which generates the same gains for both, relative to their welfares achieved in the
no-cooperation solution. Assuming the two delegates to be (y˜1, y˜2), we prove the
following
Proposition 8 T 2+(y˜1, y˜2) is non-empty.
Proof See Appendix H. 
According to this proposition, for any pair of delegates (y˜1, y˜2), pairs of taxes
(τ 1, τ 2) exist which satisfy the request of equal positive gains for both delegates. In
other words, an international agreement which represents a positive gain for both
delegates upon the no-agreement situation, is always feasible. The existence of an
IA comes from the fact the equal gains requirement limits the attempt by the poorer
delegate to pressure the richer delegate and make him finance a sufficiently large
portion of the provision of the common public good. Such a requirement amounts to
search for a “win-win” solution which dramatically reduces the conflict of interest
between the two delegates.
This is made possible because we do not impose minimal values to the gain to be
drawn from an IA. Consequently (τ 1, τ 2) may be arbitrarily close to (τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2). Even
when the incomes of the two delegates are way apart, and therefore their ideal rates
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widely divergent, they may find slight increases from the no-cooperation rates which
allow them to capture some of the positive external effect coming from higher tax
rates. If we imposed that the equal gains be above a given minimal level, we would
find that for some (y˜1, y˜2), the set of strongly feasible agreements is empty.
6.2 Bargaining.
Given that the set of strongly feasible agreements under R2 is non-empty, there is
one IA which maximizes the common gain drawn from it. What are the properties
of a such an IA? The pair of tax rates (τ g1, τ
g
2) maximizes the product of the gains
of the two delegates:
(τ g1, τ
g
2) = argmax(τ1,τ2);(τ1,τ2)∈T 2(y˜1,y˜2) Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)× Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2).
= argmax(τ1,τ2);(τ1,τ2)∈T 2(y˜1,y˜2) Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2).
Given the equal gains condition, the Nash-bargaining criterion amounts to max-
imize the gain of one delegate.
We show that:
Proposition 9 A Nash-bargained equal gains IA (τ g1, τ
g
2) is unique and such that:
(i) τ gj is a decreasing function of y˜j,
(ii) τ gj is a decreasing function of y˜−j if θ < 1, and τ
g
j is an increasing function
of y˜−j if θ > 1.
Proof See Appendix I. 
Figure 3: Impact of a decrease of y˜1
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This proposition details the impact of a variation of a delegate’s income on the
equal gain IA, when it is bargained according to the Nash-bargaining criterion.
Formally the equal gain IA satisfies two conditions:
H ′(τ 1)
y˜1
+
H ′(τ 2)
y˜2
= 1
y˜1(τ 1 − τ
∗
1) = y˜2(τ 2 − τ
∗
2)
The first one corresponds to the contract curve (the set of Pareto-optima), i.e.
Curve (1) in Figure 3; it is decreasing and convex. The second one corresponds to
the equal gain conditions; it is an increasing straight line, i.e. Line (2) in Figure 3.
Suppose that y˜1 decreases. The contract curve moves up (Curve (1’) in Fig 3):
τ 2 must increase for a given τ 1. Since τ
∗
1 is increased, the delegate in country 1 is
willing to tax more in the case of no-cooperation. For a given pair of tax rates, his
gain is reduced. To restore it, for a given tax rate τ 1 it is necessary that the tax
rate in the other country is increased. The equal gains line is moved to the right as
τ ∗1 is increased and its slope is decreased too (Line (2’) in Fig 3). As τ
∗
1 is increased,
for a given pair of tax rates, the gain for the country 1’s delegate is decreased. So
as to keep the gains equal, the tax rate in the other country has to be decreased.
Hence the two moves are in the same direction: the intersection of the two curves
is moved to the right: τ 1 is increased. However this does not imply that τ 2 is either
moving up or moving down. The move of the contract curve makes it move up, the
move of the equal gains line makes it move down. This generates the ambiguity in
the answer of τ 2 to the increase of y˜1. Given the multiple effects at stake, it happens
that it is a positive function if θ is bigger than 1, that is if the marginal impact of
an increase in τ on public good provision is sufficiently low.
6.3 Delegating.
Now let us study the political aspects of an equal gains IA. As in the case of R1, we
want to know first who are the decisive voters, when a particular electoral rule is
applied, and second who are sent by the decisive voters. The following proposition
addresses both issues in the case of the simple majority rule.
Proposition 10 (i) For any θ, under a simple majority election rule, in each coun-
try, the Condorcet winner is the median voter.
(ii) If θ ≥ 1, in each country there is strategic delegation as the chosen delegate
is richer than the median voter.
Proof See Appendix J. 
Assuming that the electoral rule is the simple majority rule, we get that in both
countries the Condorcet winner is the median voter. This comes from the single-
crossing property. Hence the richest half of the electorate in country j prefers to
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vote for the delegate proposed by the median voter than for the delegate proposed
by a poorer individual.
Then we can prove that there may exist strategic delegation in this case. Under
the assumption that θ ≥ 1, we have seen (from Proposition 9) that the two tax rates
move in opposite directions when a richer delegate is chosen in a given country. Even
if they are forced to reach the same gains for their delegates, the two Condorcet
winners play non-cooperatively when they choose their delegates. Each of them
wants to make the most out of the other country, that is make it finance the largest
possible amount of the public good. By sending a richer delegate, each median voter
gets a lower tax rate in his own country and forces the other to support a higher
tax rate. Both effects are in favor of this voter. The same argument functions in
both countries. The equilibrium of the delegation stage is strategic delegation with
richer delegates than the two median voters. This mechanism works even if the two
median voters are characterized by equal incomes.
When θ is less than 1, the issue is unclear as the tax rate τ g−j is now a decreasing
function of the delegate’s income in country j. Hence it may happen that the two
effects compensate and there is no strategic delegation. This explains why we cannot
conclude unambiguously in this case.
7 Conclusion.
From the preceeding analysis, it should be clear that the negotiation of an inter-
national agreement is fraught with difficulties and there is no wonder some do not
take off the ground, or are hotly disputed. From an economist’s point of view, the
roots of these difficulties, sometimes insuperable, are to be found in the distributive
aspects linked with these agreements. What makes the reaching of an agreement
so challenging is the necessity to take care of these issues in each of the involved
countries.
Building on a model of a two-country economy with a common public good to
be financed by contributions from both countries, we have been able to be more
precise on these redistributive considerations, internal to sovereign countries. On
the whole, the fate of an agreement on a financing scheme depends on the interaction
between the political institutions, specific to each nation, the constraints imposed on
the negotiators, the negotiation process itself, and last but not least, the inequality
schedules in both countries.
We analysed this model using a political economy perspective. We assumed a
two-stage sequential game, where the delegates are chosen by elections taking place
in each country and then bargain according to the Nash-bargaining criterion (with
equal weights). By so doing we have been able to reach a series of results which can
be summarized as follows:
• An international agreement on the financing of a common public good implies
more taxation effort in both countries than would be the case if no agreement
is reached (non cooperation).
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• There always exist agreements which are “feasible”, that is that improve the
lot of both policymakers, without additional institutional constraints.
• An international agreement involves differentiated gains and losses to different
individuals in different countries. There may be winners and losers in both
countries. An international agreement is necessarily linked to distributive
issues.
• An international agreement may not be reached, if the constraints on the
negotiation process are considered too demanding by one national delegate.
• This is the case if an equal tax rates rule is imposed on the negotiation process.
Under such a constraint, if an agreement is reached, it is likely to be linked
to strategic delegation. That is, at least one decisive voter (the voter who
is critical in the selection of her country’s delegate) chooses not to delegate
himself. Such a move is a way for this decisive voter to maximize his welfare.
• If an equal gains rule is imposed, an international agreement always exists. As-
suming a simple majority rule, both median voters are the Condorcet winners.
There may be strategic delegation in both countries.
Even though a global public good provision generates non-ambiguously positive
externalities, the financing of the global public good impacts households in a differ-
entiated way. The burden of this provision is unequally spread over the entire set
of agents. Therefore voters act strategically with the aim of free-riding and shifting
the financial burden over other agents, in particular those living in another country.
In other words, it is impossible to disentangle the allocative effects of an interna-
tional agreement from its redistributive effects as they jointly determine the political
attitude that any voter adopts with respect to the issue.
Given the various institutional features which matter in the shaping of an in-
ternational agreement, our analysis makes clear that the terms of the agreement
reflect the distribution schedule at the world level, that is the entire {yi}i=1,...N..
More precisely inequality both within countries and between countries matters. A
few polar examples will make this point clearer.
Suppose that both countries are characterized by the same distribution of income:
we could say that there is no between-country inequality, but only within-country
inequality. Then we can easily draw from our general analysis the following features:
the two median voters will be the Condorcet winners; there will be an agreement
even if R1 is imposed, as symmetry makes this rule equivalent to R2; however the
non-cooperative choice of delegates will induce the median voters to select a richer
delegate when θ is bigger than 1.
Suppose now that there is strict equality within each country but that households
in country 2 are richer than in country 1. Then by construction there will be no
strategic delegation in any country. However, under R1, it may happen that no
agreement can be established.
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When both within-country and between-country inequalities exist, the result of
the political process, be it an agreement or not, will be affected by both income
distributions, as was made clear with our discussion of the equal tax rates rule. To
prove Proposition 7 under such a rule, we assumed that every agent in Country 2
was richer than any agent in Country 1. Such an assumption can easily be viewed
as expressing a strong between-country inequality.
In light of these results, and in particular of the different implications of rules
R1 and R2, it is clear that the mandates imposed on the delegates whose task
is to negotiate an international agreement are critical for the success or failure of
this negotiation. Some constraints may actually hinder the capacity to find an
agreement. This is particularly the case for constraints imposed on the range of
instruments to be used, or some links between them.
A priori, if any constraint is to be imposed on the negotiators to limit some-
how their power, the advantages and inconveniences of instrument-based rules and
objective-based rules can be contrasted.
On the one hand, an objective-based rule such as the equal gains rule we have
studied, has the advantage that it is likely to lead to an IA. In the case of the
equal-gains rule, it is always the case. However such a result has been obtained
under the assumption of no uncertainty, and more generally perfect and complete
information. In other words, there is no need to address the issue of verifiability.
Without uncertainty or informational defects, there cannot be any misrepresentation
of utility functions, nor utility gains derived from a strategic misrepresentation of
his objectives by any delegate. However in an uncertain world or in a world where
the information sets of agents are incomplete and/or imperfect, it is different. Now
the verifiability issue becomes of paramount importance and may be insuperable. A
mandate on objectives is likely to generate a lot of opportunistic behaviors, at every
stage of the decision process. This is its major defect.
On the other hand, in such a world, the advantage, and maybe the superiority, of
a constraint put on the use of instruments becomes clear: the setting of instruments
by the involved countries is (more) easily verifiable, so as the enforcement of the
agreement by the various countries. Its drawback is that such a rule may lead to
no-agreement, because it is impossible to reconcile the objectives of the delegates.
The advantages and inconveniences of these rules are just opposite. We do not
intend to pursue on this issue: this is left for further research. Working with a
perfect information assumption is useful as a benchmark, providing the challenging
results we have just summarized. We are confident that the main message of the
present paper will remain in more elaborate settings: These results are the outcomes
of the interaction between the political process and the economic structure.
Given the complexity of the subject, the present framework can be extended in
several directions. We have already mentioned the possibility to investigate different
bargaining procedures or different rules binding the delegates. Another topic of
interest is a different specification of the model, with either more complex utility
functions, involving multiple differentiated public goods.
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Two issues are worth a few additional words. Some international agreements,
because of national constitutional provisions or because of their importance are
international treaties negotiated by governmental executives and then ratified by
Parliaments or through referenda. Ratification can be seen as an ex post control
by Parliaments or the electorates of the work done by the delegates. Hence it is
consistent with a very different sequential game than the one we considered here,
which could be seen as an a priori commitment to bargain by the electorates, which
then select carefully their delegates. The difference introduced by these two ways
to handle international agreements is an important topic to study.
Finally we mentioned above the issues of uncertainty and information. This
opens the issue of agency problems. Clearly, many such problems can be linked
with international agreements: about the preferences of the delegates, about the
state of the economy, about the implementation of an agreement, and so on. All
this is beyond the scope of the present paper, despite (or because) of its interest and
complexity.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1.
The preferred tax rate of an agent of income y in country 1 is τ ∗1(y) such that
τ ∗1(y) = argmaxτ1 F (y, τ1) where F (y, τ1) = y(1− τ 1) +H(τ 1).
The first order condition is y = H ′(τ 1).
The decision maker of country 1 has an income y˜1 , and so will choose τ 1 = τ
∗
1 such
that y˜1 = H
′(τ ∗1).
H is a concave function, thus y˜1 = H
′(τ ∗1) is a decreasing function of τ
∗
1. 
B Proof of Proposition 2.
- If (τ 1, τ 2) ∈ T (y˜1, y˜2), then Γ1 ≥ 0 and Γ2 ≥ 0, where:
Γ1 = Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)
= [W (y˜1, τ 1, τ 2)−W (y˜1, τ
∗
1, τ 2)] + [W (y˜1, τ
∗
1, τ 2)−W (y˜1, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)] .
The first bracket is always negative since τ ∗1 = argmaxτ1 W (y˜1, τ 1, τ 2) for all τ 2, and
the sum of the 2 brackets is positive since Γ1 ≥ 0, thus the second bracket must
be positive, i.e. F (y˜1, τ
∗
1) +H(τ 2) ≥ F (y˜1, τ
∗
1) +H(τ
∗
2), i.e. H(τ 2) ≥ H(τ
∗
2), which
gives τ 2 ≥ τ
∗
2 because H is an increasing function. Similarly one can find τ 1 ≥ τ
∗
1.
Γ1 = Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = F (y˜1, τ 1) +H(τ 2)− F (y˜1, τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2).
Γ1 = 0⇔ H(τ 2) = F (y˜1, τ
∗
1) +H(τ
∗
2)− F (y˜1, τ 1)
i.e.
Γ1 = 0⇔ τ 2 = H
−1(F˜ (τ 1)) , where F˜ (τ 1) = F (y˜1, τ
∗
1) +H(τ
∗
2)− F (y˜1, τ 1) is an
increasing convex function on τ 1 ∈ [τ
∗
1; 1].
H−1 is an increasing convex function, then ψ1(τ 1) = H
−1(F˜ (τ 1)) defines an
increasing convex function on [τ ∗1; 1].
ψ1(τ
∗
1) = τ
∗
2 and ψ
′
1(τ
∗
1) =
F˜ ′(τ∗1)
H′(H−1(F˜ (τ∗1)))
=
F˜ ′(τ∗1)
H′(τ∗2)
= 0.
Similarly, we show that Γ2 = 0 ⇔ τ 1 = ψ2(τ 2) , where ψ2 is an increasing con-
vex function on [τ ∗2; 1], and ψ2(τ
∗
2) = τ
∗
1.
T (y˜1, y˜2) = {(τ 1, τ 2) ∈ [τ
∗
1, 1] × [τ
∗
2, 1]; τ2 ≥ ψ1(τ 1)} ∩ {(τ 1, τ 2) ∈ [τ
∗
1, 1] ×
[τ ∗2, 1]; τ 1 ≥ ψ2(τ 2)}.
T (y˜1, y˜2) is a convex set since it is the intersection of two convex sets. It is clearly
a closed set, being the intersection of the closed sets {Γ1 ≥ 0} and {Γ2 ≥ 0}.
- Now we want to show that T+(y˜1, y˜2) 6= ∅.
Let (τ 1, τ 2) ∈]τ
∗
1; 1]×]τ
∗
2; 1]. We set hi = τ i − τ
∗
i > 0, for i = 1; 2.
Γ1 = Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = F (y˜1, τ 1) +H(τ 2)− F (y˜1, τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2)
= F (y˜1, τ 1)− F (y˜1, τ
∗
1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
2)
= ∂F
∂τ
(y˜1, τ
∗
1)h1 + o(h1) +H
′(τ ∗2)h2 + o(h2) as h1 → 0
+ and h2 → 0
+.
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= H ′(τ ∗2)h2 + o(h1) + o(h2) since τ
∗
1 = argmaxτ1 F (y˜1, τ 1)
= H ′(τ ∗2)h + o(h) as h→ 0 for h = h1 = h2.
Γ1 = H
′(τ ∗2)h + o(h) with H
′(τ ∗2) > 0 thus Γ1 > 0 for h > 0 close to 0.
We can write the same proof for Γ2 > 0.
Thus Γ1 > 0 and Γ2 > 0 for h = h1 = h2 > 0 close to 0, i.e. T+(y˜1, y˜2) 6= ∅.
T+(y˜1, y˜2) is an open set since {Γ1 > 0} and {Γ2 > 0} are open sets. 
C Proof of Proposition 3.
Let (τ 1, τ 2) be a strongly feasible agreement, i.e. such that Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) > 0
and Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) > 0.
- First, we want to show that there exists ŷ1 ∈]y˜1; +∞[ such that for i ∈ C1,
we have yi > ŷ1 ⇔ Γ1(yi, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) < 0.
We must show that y 7→ Γ1(y, τ1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) is a decreasing function.
Γ1(y, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) =W (y, τ1, τ 2)−W (y, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = y(1− τ 1) +H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−
y(1− τ ∗1)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2).
∂
∂y
Γ1(y, τ1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = τ
∗
1 − τ 1 < 0 thus y 7→ Γ1(y, τ1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) is a decreasing
function.
Moreover, Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) > 0 and limy→+∞ Γ1(y, τ1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = −∞.
Thus there exists a unique ŷ1 , such that y > ŷ1 ⇔ Γ1(y, τ1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) < 0 (and
ŷ1 > y˜1), where ŷ1 is characterized by Γ1(ŷ1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = 0.
- We have Γ1(ŷ1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = ŷ1(τ
∗
1− τ 1) +H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2) = 0,
then:
ŷ1 =
1
(τ1−τ∗1)
[H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2)] .
According to Proposition 1, we know that τ ∗j is a decreasing function of y˜j.
ŷ1 is a decreasing function of τ
∗
2, thus it is clearly an increasing function of y˜2.
Moreover:
dŷ1
dτ∗1
= 1
(τ1−τ∗1)
2 [−H
′(τ ∗1)(τ 1 − τ
∗
1) + (H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2))]
= 1
(τ1−τ∗1)
2 [−y˜1(τ 1 − τ
∗
1) + ŷ1(τ 1 − τ
∗
1)] =
ŷ1−y˜1
(τ1−τ∗1)
> 0.
Thus ŷ1 is an increasing function of τ
∗
1, and consequently a decreasing function of
y˜1.
- Similar proofs are valid for Γ2 and ŷ2. 
D Proof of Proposition 4.
- For (y˜1, y˜2) and thus (τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) given, we set γ1(τ ) = Γ1(y˜1, τ , τ , τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) and γ2(τ ) =
Γ2(y˜2, τ , τ , τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2).
Let us assume for example that y˜1 ≤ y˜2, i.e. that τ
∗
1 ≥ τ
∗
2.
γj(τ) = y˜j(1− τ) + 2H(τ)− y˜j(1− τ
∗
j)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2) for any j
γ1(τ)− γ2(τ ) = y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ )− y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ )
γ1(τ
∗
2)− γ2(τ
∗
2) = y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ
∗
2) ≥ 0
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γ′1(τ)− γ
′
2(τ ) = y˜2 − y˜1 ≥ 0
thus (γ1 − γ2)(τ) ≥ 0 for all τ ≥ τ
∗
2.
This means that there is an agreement iff Country 2 agrees, i.e.
there is an agreement iff :
∃τ , γ2(τ) > 0, i.e. iff γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) > 0, where τ
∗∗
2 = argmaxτ γ2(τ ).
- With H(τ) = τ
1−θ
1−θ
for θ 6= 1, we have:
γ2(τ) = y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ) + 2
τ1−θ
1−θ
− 1
1−θ
[
(τ ∗1)
1−θ + (τ ∗2)
1−θ
]
γ′2(τ) = −y˜2 + 2τ
−θ = − (τ ∗2)
−θ + 2τ−θ
γ′2(τ) ≥ 0⇔ τ ≤ 2
1/θτ ∗2
thus τ ∗∗2 = 2
1/θτ ∗2
γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) = y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ
∗∗
2 ) + 2
(τ∗∗2 )
1−θ
1−θ
− 1
1−θ
[
(τ ∗1)
1−θ + (τ ∗2)
1−θ
]
= (τ ∗2)
−θ (τ ∗2 − 2
1/θτ ∗2) +
1
1−θ
[
2× (21/θτ ∗2)
1−θ − (τ ∗1)
1−θ − (τ ∗2)
1−θ
]
= (τ ∗2)
1−θ
[
1− 21/θ + 1
1−θ
(
2× 2
1−θ
θ − 1−
(
τ∗1
τ∗2
)1−θ)]
γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) =
(τ∗2)
1−θ
1−θ
[
θ(21/θ − 1)−
(
τ∗1
τ∗2
)1−θ]
.
- If θ > 1,
γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) ≤ 0⇔ θ(2
1/θ − 1) ≥
(
τ∗1
τ∗2
)1−θ
=
(
y˜2
y˜1
) 1−θ
θ
γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) ≤ 0⇔
y˜2
y˜1
≥
(
θ(21/θ − 1)
) θ
1−θ = b(θ).
- If θ < 1,
γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) ≤ 0⇔ θ(2
1/θ − 1) ≤
(
τ∗1
τ∗2
)1−θ
=
(
y˜2
y˜1
) 1−θ
θ
γ2(τ
∗∗
2 ) ≤ 0⇔
y˜2
y˜1
≥
(
θ(21/θ − 1)
) θ
1−θ = b(θ).
In both cases, delegate 2 rejects the agreement iff y˜2
y˜1
> b(θ).
A similar proof is valid if we assume that y˜1 ≥ y˜2.
- With H(τ) = ln τ , i.e. if θ = 1, we obtain the same result with b(1) = 4
e
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
E Proof of Proposition 5.
τ r is defined as follows: τ r = argmaxτ γ(τ ) , where γ(τ) = γ1(τ)γ2(τ )
We consider τ ∈ {τ ; γ1(τ ) > 0 and γ2(τ ) > 0}
γj(τ) = y˜j(τ
∗
j − τ) +
1
1−θ
[
2τ 1−θ − (τ ∗1)
1−θ − (τ ∗2)
1−θ
]
= (τ ∗j )
−θ(τ ∗j − τ ) +
1
1−θ
[
2τ 1−θ − (τ ∗1)
1−θ − (τ ∗2)
1−θ
]
and
γ′j(τ) = −(τ
∗
j )
−θ + 2τ−θ
γ”j(τ ) = −2θτ
−θ−1 < 0
i.e. γj is strictly concave, for any j. Thus ln γj and ln γ = ln γ1 + ln γ2 are strictly
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concave, so that τ r = argmaxτ ln γ(τ) exists and is unique.
We set Ω(τ ) = γ′(τ ) = γ′1(τ )γ2(τ ) + γ1(τ )γ
′
2(τ)
The first order condition gives Ω(τ r) = 0, with γ1(τ
r) > 0 and γ2(τ
r) > 0, thus
γ′1(τ
r) and γ′2(τ
r) have opposite signs.
Thus Ω′(τ r) = γ”1(τ )γ2(τ ) + 2γ
′
1(τ)γ
′
2(τ) + γ1(τ)γ”2(τ ) < 0
This implies that dτ
r
dy˜2
=
∂Ω
∂y˜2
−
∂Ω
∂τ
has the sign of ∂Ω
∂y˜2
, which has the sign opposite to ∂Ω
∂τ∗2
(since τ ∗2 is a decreasing function of y˜2).
∂Ω
∂τ∗2
= ∂
∂τ∗2
(γ′1(τ )γ2(τ ) + γ1(τ )γ
′
2(τ))
thus
∂Ω
∂τ ∗2
= γ ′1(τ)
[
θ(τ ∗2)
−θ−1(τ − τ ∗2)
]
− (τ ∗2)
−θγ′2(τ) + θγ1(τ )(τ
∗
2)
−θ−1 (11)
- If y˜1 < y˜2 , then γ
′
1(τ ) > 0 > γ
′
2(τ ). The three terms in the RHS of (11) are positive
and ∂Ω
∂τ∗2
> 0. Thus ∂Ω
∂y˜2
< 0, i.e. τ r is a decreasing function of y˜2.
- If y˜1 > y˜2 , then γ
′
2(τ) > 0 > γ
′
1(τ ). Hence in Equation (11), we see that the first
two terms are negative and the third one is positive. This generates the ambiguity.

F Proof of Proposition 6.
- First we show that in each country, under majority rule, the median voter is the
Condorcet winner.
It is sufficient to show that the preferences are single peaked.
Since (C1 ×C2)∩C(θ) = ∅, the chosen delegates (y˜1, y˜2) will satisfy (y˜1, y˜2) /∈ C(θ).
According to Proposition 4, it means that no agreement will be reached. The non
cooperative tax rates are implemented.
We set Ŵ 1(y1, y˜1, y˜2) = W
1(y1, τ
r, τ r)
where
Ŵ 1(y1, y˜1, y˜2) = y1(1− τ
∗
1(y˜1))+H(τ
∗
1(y˜1))+H(τ
∗
2) = y1(1− y˜
−
1
θ
1 )+
1
1−θ
y˜
−
(1−θ)
θ
1 +
H(τ ∗2).
Setting g(y˜1) = y1(1 − y˜
−
1
θ
1 ) +
1
1−θ
y˜
−
(1−θ)
θ
1 , we have g
′(y˜1) =
1
θ
y˜
−
1
θ
−1
1 (y1 − y˜1) which
means that g is an increasing function on y˜1 ∈ [0; y1], and a decreasing function on
[y1; +∞[, i.e. it is single peaked.
- For given ym2 and y˜2, the welfare of an agent of income ym1 in country 1 is:
Ŵ 1(ym1 , y˜1, y˜2) = W
1(ym1, τ
∗
1(y˜1), τ
∗
2) = ym1(1 − τ
∗
1(y˜1)) + H(τ
∗
1(y˜1)) + H(τ
∗
2)
where τ ∗1(y˜1) is a decreasing function of y˜1.
An agent ym1 selects a delegate who maximizes Ŵ
1(ym1 , y˜1, y˜2), i.e. such that
τ ∗1(y˜1) = argmaxτ∗1 ym1(1− τ
∗
1) +H(τ
∗
1).
It means that he chooses a delegate y˜1 such that τ
∗
1(y˜1) = τ
∗
1(ym1). This implies
that y˜1 = ym1 : there is no strategic delegation. 
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G Proof of Proposition 7.
- First we show that, in the case of simple majority rule, the median voter is the
Condorcet winner in Country 2.
It is sufficient to show that the preferences are single peaked.
Here we set Ŵ 2(y2, y˜1, y˜2) = W
2(y2, τ
r, τ r) = y2(1− τ
r) + 2
1−θ
.(τ r)1−θ
where τ r = τ r(y˜1, y˜2).
Given the assumption we made, we have y˜1 < y˜2 thus
dτr
dy˜2
< 0 according to Propo-
sition 5.
An agent characterized by income y2 prefers a delegate y˜2 maximizing (for y˜1
given):
maxy˜2 W
2(y2,τ
r(y˜1, y˜2), τ
r(y˜1, y˜2)) = maxy˜2
[
y2(1− τ
r(y˜1, y˜2)) +
2
1−θ
.(τ r(y˜1, y˜2))
1−θ
]
.
We set B2 =
d
dy˜2
(W 2(y2,τ
r(y˜1, y˜2), τ
r(y˜1, y˜2))) =
dτ r
dy˜2
[
−y2 +
2
(τr)θ
]
.
For y˜1 and y2 given, we get:
B2 = 0 for (τ
r)θ = 2
y2
B2 > 0 for (τ
r)θ > 2
y2
B2 < 0 for (τ
r)θ < 2
y2
where τ r is a decreasing function of y˜2 ,
thus B2 > 0 for y˜2 small, and B2 < 0 for y˜2 large, for y˜1 fixed.
We can conclude that preferences are single peaked in Country 2, so the median
voter is a Condorcet winner in Country 2.
- Let us show now that there is strategic delegation in Country 2.
The median voter ym2 of Country 2 prefers a delegate y˜2 maximizing:
W 2(ym2,τ
r(y˜1, y˜2), τ
r(y˜1, y˜2)) = ym2 (1− τ
r(y˜1, y˜2)) +
2
1−θ
.(τ r(y˜1, y˜2))
1−θ
(for y˜1 and ym2 given).
We set Bm2 =
d
dy˜2
(W 2(ym2,τ
r(y˜1, y˜2), τ
r(y˜1, y˜2))) =
dτ r
dy˜2
[
−ym2 +
2
(τ r)θ
]
,
where dτ
r
dy˜2
< 0.
Three cases may arise
(i) right corner solution ⇔ Bm2 > 0, i.e. (τ
r)θ > 2
ym2
, and y˜2 = y
max
2
(ii) left corner solution ⇔ Bm2 < 0, i.e. (τ
r)θ < 2
ym2
, and y˜2 = y
min
2
(iii) interior solution ⇔ Bm2 = 0, i.e. (τ
r)θ = 2
ym2
In all cases, γ′(τ r) = γ′1(τ
r)γ2(τ
r) + γ1(τ
r)γ′2(τ
r) = 0 thus γ′1(τ
r) = 2
(τr)θ
− y˜1
and γ′2(τ
r) = 2
(τ r)θ
− y˜2 have opposite signs. As y˜1 < y˜2, y˜1 ≤
2
(τr)θ
≤ y˜2.
Let us study these three cases (i), (ii) and (iii)
(i) gives y˜2 = y
max
2 > ym2 , so there is strategic delegation.
(ii) ym2 <
2
(τr)θ
and y˜2 = y
min
2 , thus y
min
2 = y˜2 ≥
2
(τr)θ
> ym2 which is impossible.
(iii) ym2 =
2
(τr)θ
≤ y˜2.
There is strategic delegation when 2
(τr)θ
< y˜2.
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Let us show that ym2 =
2
(τ r)θ
= y˜2 , is impossible. If ym2 =
2
(τr)θ
= y˜2, then
γ′1(τ
r) = 2
(τr)θ
− y˜1 = y˜2 − y˜1.
But γ′(τ r) = 0 and γ′2(τ
r) = 0, thus γ2(τ
r) = 0. Let us show that this last case
is impossible.
We know that y˜j = (τ
∗
j)
−θ. We have:
γ2(τ
r) = (τ ∗2)
−θ(τ ∗2 − τ
r) + 1
1−θ
[
2(τ r)1−θ − (τ ∗1)
1−θ − (τ ∗2)
1−θ
]
= y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ
r) +
1
1−θ
[y˜2τ
r − τ ∗1y˜1 − τ
∗
2y˜2]
which leads to
γ2(τ
r) = y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ
r)
[
1− 1
1−θ
]
−
τ∗1 y˜1
1−θ
= y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ
r)
(
−θ
1−θ
)
−
τ∗1 y˜1
1−θ
.
If γ2(τ
r) = 0, thus τ ∗1y˜1 = y˜2(τ
r − τ ∗2)θ, i.e. y˜
1− 1
θ
1 = y˜
1− 1
θ
2
(
τr−τ∗2
τ∗2
)
which implies(
y˜2
y˜1
)(1−θ)/θ
=
(
21/θ − 1
)
θ, that is: y˜2
y˜1
=
[
θ
(
21/θ − 1
)]θ/(1−θ)
.
It means that the ratio y˜2
y˜1
is in the boundary of C(θ), which is excluded by
assumption. 
H Proof of Proposition 8.
(τ 1, τ 2) is an equal gains strongly feasible agreement iff:
Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) > 0
In that case, we necessarily have τ 1 > τ
∗
1 and τ 2 > τ
∗
2.
We know that Γ1(y˜1, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = Γ2(y˜2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = 0
For (y˜1, y˜2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) given, we set:
G˜(τ 1, τ 2) = Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)−Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = y˜2(τ
∗
2− τ 2)− y˜1(τ
∗
1− τ 1)
G˜(τ 1, τ 2) = 0⇔ τ 2 = τ
∗
2 +
y˜1
y˜2
(τ 1 − τ
∗
1)
thus for ε > 0 small enough, if τ 1 ∈]τ
∗
1; τ
∗
1 + ε[ and τ 2 = τ
∗
2 +
y˜1
y˜2
(τ 1 − τ
∗
1), then
(τ 1, τ 2) ∈ T
1
+(y˜1, y˜2) 
I Proof of Proposition 9.
Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ 1) +H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2)
thus
Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)− Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ 1)− y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ 2)
To maximize Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)× Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) under the constraint
Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)
is of course equivalent to maximize Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) under the same constraint.
There exists a maximum since T 2(y˜1, y˜2) is a compact set.
The Lagrangian of the last program is:
Lµ(y˜1, y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)−µ (Γ2(y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)− Γ1(y˜1, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2))
= y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ 1) +H(τ 1) +H(τ 2)−H(τ
∗
1)−H(τ
∗
2)− µ [y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ 2)− y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ 1)]
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Hence the gradient of Lµ is equal to:
∇Lµ(y˜1, y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) =
(
−y˜1 +H
′(τ 1)− µy˜1
H ′(τ 2) + µy˜2
)
and we get
∃µ,∇Lµ(y˜1, y˜2, τ 1, τ 2, τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2) = 0⇔
H ′(τ 1)
y˜1
+
H ′(τ 2)
y˜2
= 1
The Lagrangian is strictly concave since HessLµ is definite negative, thus there
exists a unique maximum (τ g1, τ
g
2). It is the unique solution of the system{
H′(τ1)
y˜1
+ H
′(τ2)
y˜2
= 1
y˜1(τ
∗
1 − τ 1) = y˜2(τ
∗
2 − τ 2)
where y˜j = H
′(τ ∗j ) = (τ
∗
j )
−θ and H ′(τ j) = (τ j)
−θ.
(τ g1, τ
g
2) is then the solution of
(G)

(
τ∗1
τ1
)θ
+
(
τ∗2
τ2
)θ
= 1
τ∗1−τ1
(τ∗1)
θ =
τ∗2−τ2
(τ∗2)
θ
Let G1(τ 1, τ 2) =
(
τ∗1
τ1
)θ
+
(
τ∗2
τ2
)θ
−1 andG2(τ 1, τ 2) =
τ∗1−τ1
(τ∗1)
θ −
τ∗2−τ2
(τ∗2)
θ , andG =
(
G1
G2
)
(G) define a system of implicit functions. According to the implicit function theorem
(for a system of 2 functions), for τ ∗2 given:
∃ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) functions, such that (G) ⇔
{
τ 1 = ϕ1(τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)
τ 2 = ϕ2(τ
∗
1, τ
∗
2)
for (τ 1, τ 2) in an
open set,
and we have
(
dτ1
dτ∗1
dτ2
dτ∗1
)
= Jacϕ = −(JacτG)
−1(Jacτ∗1G), where
Jacτ∗1G =
 θ (τ∗1)θ−1τθ1
1−θ
(τ∗1)
θ +
θτ1
(τ∗1)
θ+1
 and JacτG =
 −θ (τ∗1)θτθ+11 −θ (τ∗2)θτθ+12
− 1
(τ∗1)
θ
1
(τ∗2)
θ

Setting D = − det JacτG > 0, we have:
(JacτG)
−1 = −1
D

1
(τ∗2)
θ θ
(τ∗2)
θ
τθ+12
1
(τ∗1)
θ −θ
(τ∗1)
θ
τθ+11

and(
dτ1
dτ∗1
dτ2
dτ∗1
)
= Jacϕ = 1
D
 θ (τ∗1)
θ−1
(τ∗2)
θ
τθ1
+
θ(1−θ)(τ∗2)
θ
(τ∗1)
θ
τθ+12
+
θ2τ1(τ∗2)
θ
(τ∗1)
θ+1
τθ+12
θ
τ∗1τ
θ
1
− (1−θ)θ
τθ+11
− θ
2
τ∗1τ
θ
1

thus dτ1
dτ∗1
= 1
D
[
θ
(τ∗1)
θ−1
(τ∗2)
θ
τθ1
+
θ(τ∗2)
θ
(τ∗1)
θ+1
τθ+12
(τ ∗1 + θ(τ 1 − τ
∗
1))
]
> 0
and dτ2
dτ∗1
= θ
Dτ∗1τ
θ+1
1
(1− θ) (τ 1 − τ
∗
1) has the sign of 1− θ. 
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J Proof of Proposition 10.
(i) The welfare of an agent of country 1 and of income y is:
W 1(y, τg1(y˜1, y˜2), τ
g
2(y˜1, y˜2)) = y (1− τ
g
1(y˜1, y˜2)) +H (τ
g
1(y˜1, y˜2)) +H (τ
g
2(y˜1, y˜2))
For a given y˜2, this welfare is then a function Ŵ 1(y, y˜1, y˜2) of y and y˜1, i.e.
Ŵ 1(y, y˜1, y˜2) = y (1− τ
g
1(y˜1, y˜2)) +H (τ
g
1(y˜1, y˜2)) +H (τ
g
2(y˜1, y˜2))
∂Ŵ 1
∂y
(y, y˜1, y˜2) = 1− τ
g
1(y˜1, y˜2)
∂2Ŵ 1
∂y˜1∂y
(y, y˜1, y˜2) = −
∂τg1
∂y˜1
(y˜1, y˜2) > 0
thus according to the single crossing property, the median voter theorem applies:
the Condorcet winner is the median voter.
(ii) Who will be chosen as delegate by the median voter?
An agent of income y will prefer to send a delegate of income y˜1 maximizing
Ŵ 1(y, y˜1, y˜2).
Let B = ∂Ŵ
1
∂y˜1
(y, y˜1, y˜2) =
∂τg1
∂y˜1
[−y +H ′(τ g1)] +
∂τg2
∂y˜1
H ′(τ g2)
where
∂τg1
∂y˜1
< 0 , H ′(τ g2) > 0 and
∂τg2
∂y˜1
has the sign of θ − 1.
The first order condition is B = 0, which leads to [−y +H ′(τ g1)] =
∂τ
g
2
∂y˜1
H′(τg2)
−
∂τ
g
1
∂y˜1
If θ ≥ 1, it means that [−y +H ′(τ g1)] ≥ 0, i.e. y ≤ H
′(τ g1)
Since H ′(τ g1) < H
′(τ ∗1) = y˜1, we can conclude that y < y˜1
Conclusion: if θ ≥ 1, any agent (including the median one) prefers to choose a
delegate richer than himself. In other words, there is strategic delegation. 
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